Technology1 min read

Upload2Shell · CVE-2026-125396

By · Published by Everything Blog

In short

The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-125396, stems from a flaw in Ghostscript's font processing that allows disguised files to achieve command execution across print, email, and upload pipelines. Researchers demonstrated practical exploitation by targeting an anonymous IPP print job on a shared Debian 13 CUPS queue to execute code as the `lp` user. Major environments, including Google production infrastructure, MediaWiki, Roundcube, and WordPress plugins, were exposed prior to remediation. Maintainer Artifex resolved the underlying font-loader defect under Bug 709684, accompanied by vendor package rollouts.

Key points

  • Downstream software relying on Ghostscript for thumbnailing and document rendering must a…: Downstream software relying on Ghostscript for thumbnailing and document rendering must apply immediate security patches to prevent remote compromise.
  • WordPress core and third-party upload mechanisms required dedicated remediation tracked u…: WordPress core and third-party upload mechanisms required dedicated remediation tracked under CVE-2026-65640 to neutralize renderer exposure.
  • Broad platform vendors including Google, Debian, and Ubuntu have deployed coordinated fix…: Broad platform vendors including Google, Debian, and Ubuntu have deployed coordinated fixes to safeguard varied email, print, and preview pipelines.

Sources checked by our analysis pipeline: 1

Debian 13 CUPS

Ghostscript 10.05.1~dfsg-1+deb13u1

- Access

- Anonymous IPP Print-Job to a shared network queue

- Observed

- Command on the host as

uid=7(lp)

- Proof

- One remote run; separate 20/20 local conversions

A use-after-free in Ghostscript’s Type 1 font loader lets a crafted document cross Ghostscript’s -dSAFER

sandbox, alter native path controls, and execute attacker-chosen commands as the rendering process.

Ghostscript sits beneath print, email, upload, and preview workflows. Our ImageMagick research showed how files named .png

or .jpg

can still reach Ghostscript through image conversion. The index below records confirmed affected paths alongside additional applications whose renderer routes we traced.

Upload2Shell / public record

From the first escape to the downstream reports, fixes, and publication.

We found a Type 1 font-loader path out of Ghostscript's -dSAFER

boundary. A crafted document gained native access inside the rendering process.

A signed-out request for an attacker-hosted file reached Ghostscript in Google's document renderer. We sent the production proof to Google.

Core's upload path exposed the renderer to Author+ users and any Contributor granted upload_files

. Public upload fields in…

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