The injected payload functioned as a client-side skimmer that captured cookies, screenshots, payment details, and replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses while serving exploit kits to Apple mobile devices. Optimizely responded to the campaign by purging the unauthorized code, invalidating user tokens, and resetting compromised accounts. External telemetry from Fortirix showed that 52 tracked entities were loading the targeted script structure, including five verified victims. Because the campaign relied on publicly visible homepage script tags, the activity was observable from the outside rather than hidden in backend infrastructure.
Key points
Distributing malicious payloads through legitimate third-party content delivery networks…: Distributing malicious payloads through legitimate third-party content delivery networks allows attackers to completely bypass standard customer trust protections.
Client-side browser attacks remain uniquely visible externally because the malicious scri…: Client-side browser attacks remain uniquely visible externally because the malicious scripts reside directly within publicly readable website tags.
Optimizely mitigated the immediate intrusion by wiping the unauthorized code, resetting a…: Optimizely mitigated the immediate intrusion by wiping the unauthorized code, resetting affected accounts, revoking access tokens, and warning customers.
Sources checked by our analysis pipeline: 1
All figures are aggregate and anonymized, drawn from Fortirix’s own external monitoring data. The footprint below reflects organizations observed loading Optimizely’s experimentation script; the live re-check was run on November 18, 2026. Every figure is a count of externally observed scripts, not a vulnerability verdict. See Methodology.
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